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Abstract 
 
The metaphor of network (and its cognate terms node, lattice, inter-linkage, and so on) plays a 
prominent role in contemporary social science. However, network metaphors come in and go out 
of sociological fashion, and may be employed in incompatible ways even by sociologists 
examining the same phenomenon. Writing in the 1980s Wilhelm Baldamus considered it 
remarkable that a metaphor which had hardly any explanatory power to start with could maintain 
its popularity for long periods for no tangible reason. This paper will examine Baldamus’s critique 
of network metaphors by looking at some examples in contemporary sociology, specifically the 
work of Harrison C White, and Actor Network Theory (ANT). The paper argues that the use of 
metaphors is probably inevitable, and can enhance as well as diminish our understanding of social 
experience. However, the network metaphor often creates artificial objects and makes us think we 
have been precise when we have been vague. The paper calls for a more critical and reflective 
approach to using metaphors in social scientific analysis. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
[Newton Hoenikker is playing cat’s cradle with his father, Felix Hoenikker, inventor of the 
atomic bomb:] 
‘But he went down on his knees on the carpet next to me, and he showed me his teeth, and he 
waved that tangle of string in my face. “See? See? See?” he asked. “Cat’s cradle. See the 
cat’s cradle? See where the nice pussycat sleeps? Miaow. Miaow.” …  
I burst into tears. I jumped up and I ran out of the house as fast as I could go.’  
 
(Vonnegut, [1963] 1965: 13) 
 
Metaphor is pervasive in the human sciences (Turner, 2010), as it is in everyday language (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2003), and this is, most likely, unavoidable. But this does not mean that we should ignore 
the metaphorical in the human sciences. On the contrary, unless we identify metaphors we will run the 
risk of confusing the metaphorical with the literal, something that would hamper our inquiries. More 
than that, the use and articulation of metaphors, particularly spatial metaphors, can have remarkable 
effects upon our perceptions 
 
There is little doubt that the often remarkable longevity particularly of spatial metaphors is a 
contributing factor to the survival of obsolete theoretical conventions. The concept of ‘network’ 
is of special interest here because it shows that even a metaphor with hardly any explanatory 
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power to start with can maintain its popularity for long periods for no tangible reason. It will also 
be seen from this example how an apparently unambiguous metaphor may circulate from one 
speciality to another without anyone noticing the delusions, pretences or sheer inanities which it 
entails. (Baldamus, [1982] 2010: 107) 
 
Baldamus’s work is rich in insight, and his approach to sociology was one of ‘serious playfulness’ 
(Eldridge, 2010: 19). In his 1982 paper deriding the concept of network Baldamus shows that it is 
only ever defined synonymously, and the alleged superiority of network studies comes from the 
reiteration of a descriptive vocabulary deploying synonymous terms. For Baldamus, network 
sociology is conceptually vacuous as it is merely applying a different range of labels to objects 
identified in the world, and will often apply a number of different labels to the same phenomena. The 
abstraction from real relationships, subjectively experienced, to blockmodels of physically 
‘observable’ representations of relationships is similarly described as being vacuous, and leads 
Baldamus to conclude that ‘The failure of the network metaphor to advance sociological theory by 
means of mathematic aggregation techniques is not really surprising. Even the most imaginative 
manipulation of its literal meaning cannot get rid of the strictly physical intuitive implications.’ 
(Baldamus, 2010: 115) For Baldamus, the spatial aspect of the network metaphor structures our 
perceptions such that it distorts our understanding of the aspect of society we are investigating.  
Baldamus, for the most part, confined his criticism of the network metaphor in sociology to 
examples from the late 1970s, and in particular the mathematical sociology of Harrison C. White. It 
is, perhaps, a pity that Networks remained unpublished and thus unread by White, who has, 
undaunted, continued in his endeavours to produce a general theory of society based on the core idea 
of social network and that can be analysed using the mathematical / blockmodelling method (White, 
2008: 265-6). I will look in some detail at how White’s sociological theory is constructed. I will then 
compare this to another form of network sociology, one that emerged after Baldamus wrote his paper 
in 1982: Actor Network Theory (usually abbreviated to ANT). I will argue that in both cases users of 
these theories have forgotten that they are dealing with metaphors and have confused the metaphor of 
network with the social phenomenon they are attempting to investigate.   
 
Actors versus Identities 
 
Originating in the work of Bruno Latour (1987, 1996, 1999), Michel Callon (1986, 1987) and John 
Law (1986, 1991, 1994), actor-network theory is now a heterogeneous set of approaches that coalesce 
around a post-positivist, post-structural perspective that takes seriously the relationships between 
humans and non-humans (Erickson, 2005: 82). ANT’s roots in SSK and social constructionism are 
clear. ANT is also the site from which a sustained analysis of technoscience emerged, as it argues 
strongly that ‘technology’ and ‘science’ are inextricably linked. ANT challenges the general social 
theoretical idea that human social relations ‘were simply unmediated relationships between naked 
human beings, rather than being made possible and stable by artefacts and technologies’ (MacKenzie, 
1998: 14), as well as received assumptions about the social and the human; crucially, it rejects 
essentialism and reductionism. ANT is identifiable in a number of clear ways. The first is through 
self-report and association: a number of theorists and researchers claim allegiance to ANT. The 
second is through actions: a number of local studies that are placing social action and relationships in 
the context of acting with other actors and actants inside networks are gesturing their adherence to 
some of the tenets of ANT. Thirdly, there is the adoption of concepts and vocabulary: enrolment / dis-
enrolment, actor / actant, network / region, and so on. And there is, perhaps, a final strategy we can 
adopt for identifying ANT: simply looking at the theories deployed in Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), as ANT has now become a hegemonic mode of theorising in this emerging discipline.  
ANT is expanding out from its original home in STS, becoming a mode of theorising in 
sociology and other human sciences. It allows users to see the social world, or parts of it, as an 
assemblage of networks, each of which is composed of translations between co-existing mediators 
(Latour, 2005: 108). The result is a rejection of previous categories and understandings of ‘the social’ 
in favour of a rather different perspective 
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I can now state the aim of this sociology of associations more precisely: there is no society, no 
social realm, and no social ties, but there exist translations between mediators that may generate 
traceable associations. (Latour, 2005: 108) 
 
In contrast, White presents a general sociology that provides a theory of the social world very much in 
the tradition of Talcott Parsons (1951), and White does make some comments on the similarities of 
his work and Parsons’s AGIL scheme (White, 2008: 76). However, it is the ‘general systems theory’ 
of Niklas Luhmann (White, 2008: 14) that White most often refers to (although other followers of 
Luhmann may not agree with the characterization presented in White’s work). White’s picture of 
society starts by positing that all entities in society are identities, and that all identities seek control 
and to avoid control ‘slipping away’ to other identities. By identity White primarily means ‘persons’, 
but also means organizations. Identities seek control in social situations through gaining footings – 
fixing themselves inside relationships and thus, for White, producing netdoms (a neologism that is 
formed from contracting network-domains). Identities achieve control through the articulation of 
stories, accounts that describe the role and position of individuals. Identities keep shifting between 
netdoms until they find ones that give them the control that they want 
 
Thus the world comes from identities attempting control within their relations to other identities. 
In their search for control, identities switch from netdom to netdom, and each switching is at 
once a decoupling from somewhere and an embedding into somewhere. (White, 2008: 2) 
 
This is a rather stark vision: a world of all against all struggling to gain and retain control. Individuals 
must secure their identities in netdoms through their own actions and through manipulating ties to 
give the control that they require to feel secure. Organizations, similarly, must articulate stories that 
allow them to control their netdom (or, more likely, catnet [category-network]) in competition with 
other organizations trying to do the same thing. For White, the world is a series of stochastic 
processes: random events that have a predictable outcome. He may be right, of course, but another 
reason for picturing the world in this way may be that it provides a role for the sociologist. Whilst the 
social world may appear to be a series of random events to the untrained participant, the Whitean 
sociologist knows that by analysis and measurement of ties, network structures and the strengths of 
these they can predict the likely outcomes of stochastic processes.  
White’s work is very complex, difficult to read and written in a style that reminded me of 
1970s machine translations from Russian into English.
3
 White uses words in surprising ways – 
discipline, for example, is simply not what one would expect (I think White really means Goffman’s 
‘frame’ (Goffman, [1974] 1986)) – and he enjoys making up new words (netdom, streq, catnet) and 
then abandoning them.  Yet White does produce a coherent and systematic account of how social 
formations come into being, what sustains them and what their purpose is, and a comprehensive 
network sociology, based on the action frame of reference (i.e. very much in the American tradition).  
Despite this, I argue here that it doesn’t explain very much at all, and seems to add almost 
nothing to our understanding of the social world. Indeed, the opposite is the case: White’s theory 
removes things, such as contexts, and replaces them with a rather thin soup (one of White’s many 
metaphors) of ties in stochastic processes. The focus is consistently on the individual and this leads to 
some odd perspectives. For example, in a reading of Elizabeth Bott’s work (Bott, 1957, 1971), White 
posits that stratification effects come from networks, i.e. that your social class is a consequence of 
your position in a network. ‘Stratification might be analyzed as a super-catnet of profiles resulting 
from stochastic interactions within networks and disciplines.’ (White, 2008: 198). White’s model is 
entirely voluntaristic: from this perspective we are all choosing our social class, and class is a 
                                                      
3
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and deployment of new terms: ‘The term envelope captures the idea that it is only the outer limits of the 
cumulation of contingencies that has impact. This is a new sort of embedding where there is no re-forming of 
identity, but rather a factual accumulation that shapes or reflects a constraint on action that is comparable to 
embedding.’ (White, 2008: 148) 
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consequence of our actions, not something that precedes us.  In a later paper White again cites Bott as 
the founder of network sociology, but then translates her work into a different terminology with a 
different meaning: companionate and segregate networks. Where Bott examined relationships inside 
networks, White cites her work as a starting point for his analysis of companionate networks 
composed of other networks (White et al., 2007: 197), something that Bott did not consider possible. 
Networks, for Bott, are aggregates of ties that individuals have, and are not nested inside each other. 
In contrast, White sees networks as being real things that can be made up of ties between identities 
(and bear in mind the very broad definition this word has, encompassing individuals, groups and even 
multinational corporations) or ties between networks, where networks can be nested inside other 
networks. But a more significant issue is that of science: White’s theory cannot explain why it is that 
scientific knowledge, clearly a product of human social action, takes the form that it does, nor how it 
is possible in his ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ world that better work from lower ranked ‘netdoms’ 
(i.e. laboratories) gets prestige and identity / control in the scientific community.  
White may wish to reply that these are not his concerns, but then in what way has he 
produced a general sociology? His theory cannot consider anything external to identities (which 
ultimately are people) so all roles and ideas simply arise inside individuals – but is this really 
possible: does each doctor really re-construct the narrative of the medic for themselves? Are social 
roles not arrived at through collective effort? How can one explain tradition, or culture, or religion?  
The network metaphor has been hammered into a particular shape and form that is a reflection of a set 
of values that this group of social scientists hold, but it ends up occluding some very significant things 
in the world. It also confines analysis to a synchronic frame of reference, or at best, to analysis over a 
very short period of time. But, most crucially, network has ceased to be a metaphor and has become 
an object we can identify in the world.  
 
From Metaphor to ‘Real’ Object: Transitions in White and ANT 
 
How did we get to this point? White’s early work says that the use of the word ‘network’ is 
metaphorical. In his classic 1976 paper on blockmodelling, White agrees with Von Wiese’s 
identification of network as metaphor, where he notes that if we were to stop the constantly flowing 
stream of inter human activity then ‘we would observe an apparently impenetrable network of lines 
between men…Outside this network, above and below it, there can be nothing that is social, unless we 
leave the plane of empirical observation’. They go on to note that ‘during the past decade, the network 
metaphor has become increasingly popular with social scientists’ (White et al., 1976: 730).  
Yet by the time we reach White’s magnum opus Identity and Control (1992, 2008) the idea of 
network as metaphor has been forgotten. Now networks (or netdoms, or catnets) are the reality that 
we are inside, they are the social totality. They are tangible objects that are produced through specific 
processes, have a life of their own and their own finality 
 
Networks need not persist just as they happen to be thrown up by stochastic eruption, and more 
than a particular discipline, with its projected identity, will persist and reproduce itself 
independent of social context, which is in turn made up of networks. (White, 2008: 112) 
 
Similarly in the core ANT theory texts we see the initial understanding of ‘network’ as metaphor 
 
If technoscience may be described as being so powerful and yet so small, so concentrated and so 
dilute, it means it has the characteristics of a network. The word network indicates that resources 
are concentrated in a few places – the knots and the nodes – which are connected with one 
another – the links and the mesh: these connections transform the scattered resources into a net 
that may seem to extend everywhere. Telephone lines, for instance, are minute and fragile, so 
minute they are invisible on a map and so fragile that each may be easily cut; nevertheless, the 
telephone network ‘covers’ the whole world. The notion of network will help us to reconcile the 
two contradictory aspects of technoscience and to understand how so few people may seem to 
cover the world. (Latour, 1987: 180) [Italic added] 
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Here, Latour is suggesting that we can imagine technoscience (a concept) as being like a network (i.e. 
using ‘network’ as a metaphor). He uses attendant metaphors in constructing his analogy: mesh, net, 
links. He doesn’t say that this is an actual network, rather that we can picture the abstraction he calls 
technoscience as being a network of nodes.  
Another key originator of ANT, John Law, provides a similar, metaphorical approach. He 
notes that we can imagine the notion of network as a descriptive tool that allows the observer to 
identify connections in, for example, scientometrics. But his ‘actor-network’ is different from this. It 
is ‘a semiotic machine for waging war on essential differences’ (Law, 1999: 7) (more metaphors 
being brought to bear). This metaphorical network allows the sociologist to cut through essentialism, 
and to challenge the hegemony of preceding spatial metaphors. But, Law notes, there is a danger here, 
namely that the success of ANT leads to the naturalization of its own topological assumptions (Ibid: 
8). An example, taken from Law’s earlier work, illustrates this clearly 
 
People are networks. We are all artful arrangements of bits and pieces. … We are composed of, 
or constituted by our props, visible, invisible, present and past. (Law, 1994: 33) 
 
The slippage between network as metaphor and network as object in the world is clear here, and in 
many other ANT studies. For example, Maggie Mort’s study of the enrolment and disenrollment 
processes in the Trident nuclear submarine programme provides us with a good example of the 
problem common to many ANT studies which see network as actuality, not as metaphor. Where 
Latour is deliberately and provocatively ambivalent about the concept of network, and about the 
usefulness of the network metaphor, Mort shows no hesitation in quickly identifying networks in the 
social world she investigates. Her book aims to provide 
 
...a narrative about Trident submarine production and about the history of VSEL (the key design 
/ construction company) that did not focus on the views and actions of managers. I have gone 
about this first by identifying a network within a network (the BAEC [Barrow Alternative 
Employment Committee]) and attempting to describe the relationship between the two and 
second by attempting to theorize the relationship between the dominant (Trident) network and its 
marginalized or expelled actants: workers who had been made redundant and technologies that 
had been abandoned. (Mort, 2002: 8) 
 
All notions of metaphor have been abandoned here in favour of analysis of actual objects visible in 
the world. Yet there are still problems and ambiguities here, particularly the lack of reflection on 
whether it is possible to have a network inside a network (note the similarity of Mort’s formulation of 
network to that of White), and the need, in her account, for networks to possess agency, visible in the 
way that they can expel or enrol. On top of that, we also need to consider if it is possible for us to 
represent these ‘real’ objects in the ‘real’ world.  
Similarly in White’s work, networks are very tangible. In applying his theory of identity and 
control White has tended to focus on the world of business and organization. For example, a recent 
study of the aerospace industry looked at how the identities of two corporations, Airbus and Boeing, 
engaged in a struggle for control and ‘footing amidst chaos’ which resulted in a network of ties. These 
ties get ‘encrusted into institutions’ such that an aircraft industry becomes an identity in itself (White 
et al., 2007: 181). Throughout this analysis White et al. find agency in these networks: they can act, 
have impacts on other networks, are made up of actual things. They work through processes, become 
interwoven with other networks, and arrange themselves into hierarchies. Networks also own things: 
they have their own network resources which ‘may include identities, for example, particular 
personnel assigned to a given project or who have special expertise, or material resources such as 
budgets, patents, logos or specialized equipment’ (Ibid: 184).  
In ANT, Latour has recently attempted to replace ‘network’, or rather reconfigure it. But 
rather than the concretization of the metaphor being the problem, it is the attendant ambiguity that 
Latour dislikes: ‘The word network is so ambiguous that we should have abandoned it long ago’ 
(Latour, 2005: 129). This is not the same as the point made by Baldamus – that our definitions of 
‘network’ are invariably synonymous ones, and that, lacking definition, network should be 
abandoned. On the contrary, Latour does want us to keep the word, but to use it in a different way. 
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Rather than looking for networks in the world, Latour now proposes that we use network as a tool that 
helps to describe something, and as a measure of energy and movement 
 
So, network is an expression to check how much energy, movement, and specificity our own 
reports are able to capture. Network is a concept, not a thing out there. It is a tool to help 
describe something, not what is being described. It has the same relationship with the topic at 
hand as a perspective grid to a traditional single point perspective painting: drawn first, the lines 
might allow one to project a three-dimensional object onto a flat piece of linen; but they are not 
what is to be painted, only what has allowed the painter to give the impression of depth before 
they are erased. In the same way, a network is not what is represented in the text, but what 
readies the text to take the relay of actors as mediators. The consequence is that you can provide 
an actor-network account of topics which have in no way the shape of a network – a symphony, 
a piece of legislation, a rock from the moon, an engraving. Conversely, you may well write 
about technical networks – television, e-mails, satellites, salesforce – without at any point 
providing an actor-network account. (Latour, 2005: 131) 
 
This rather begs the question: why network and not some other metaphor? Latour sticks with it for the 
imagery it provides – the point-to-point connections, gaps / emptiness, a necessity for making / 
construction. However, he also notes that there are some problems with the metaphor, and suggests 
thinking instead of ‘worknets’ as a term to describe and analyse the social world; the reason for this is 
to maintain a view on the net-like nature of the things we are examining 
 
If it is true, as ANT claims, that the social landscape possesses such a flat ‘networky’ topography 
and that the ingredients making up society travel inside tiny conduits, what is in between the 
meshes of such a circuitry? This is why, no matter its many defects, the net metaphor remains so 
powerful. Contrary to substance, surface, domain, and spheres that fill every centimetre of what 
they bind and delineate, nets, networks, and ‘worknets’ leave everything they don’t connect 
simply unconnected. Is not a net made up, first and foremost, of empty spaces? (Latour, 2005: 
242) 
 
Perhaps it is, but then what about all the other attendant imagery – why are ANT accounts not about 
catching things? Why do ANT-account nets not ‘trawl’ through some medium? Latour himself 
destroys the metaphorical networkiness of network by noting that ‘you can hang your fish nets to dry 
but you can’t hang an actor-network: it has to be traced anew by the passage of another vehicle, 
another circulating entity’ (Latour, 2005: 132). But that’s not what we think networks in the everyday 
world do – the telephone network or the electrical power network are not traced out anew every time 
we want to use them. And can fish nets themselves, or fish net stockings be the subject of an actor-
network account? If so, are they being ‘traced anew’ on every use?  
Where is this taking us? Is network a suitable metaphor or not? Why does Latour want to 
keep it? And what about those other metaphors that Latour drops in to his recent writings: social fluid, 
meshes, circuitry? It does rather look as if Baldamus was correct and that network is always defined 
synonymously. Latour’s step back, from network to net, doesn’t really change anything, indeed it 
perhaps explains less as we really aren’t talking about nets as a fisherman or hosier would know them.   
 
Why Worry? 
 
Perhaps we shouldn’t worry about the use of the network metaphor. All language is, to some extent, 
metaphoric and, as Wittgenstein noted, no language can accurately describe our thoughts and 
experiences, even though we tell ourselves that it can (Wittgenstein, 2001).  But that is not really 
sufficient here. Lakoff and Johnson’s work (2003) is useful in reminding us that what we are really 
dealing with are metaphorical concepts, and that these, when we use them, construct a picture of the 
world. When we use the network metaphor we are creating a picture that prescribes our understanding 
of the world. What we really need to consider when we do this is, what are we missing, what do we 
not attend to? This is the core question for both ANT and White: by deploying the network metaphor, 
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by seeing the world as being just network, what are you not seeing. To borrow their metaphor – what 
falls through the gaps in the mesh?  
By seeing the world as just nodes connected by some kind of ties we are missing some 
important context – pre-existing knowledge and discourses external to us being the most obvious – 
that have significant effects on our lives. We are also buying into an atomised and individuated 
picture of the world, one that, admittedly, chimes well with the neo-liberal conception of society. In 
terms of method and field work, ANT encourages a form of mimesis – a re-inscribing and re-labelling 
of things in the world, but not a mode of understanding. Re-labelling a conversation as a translation 
between mediators in a network, or a move to achieve control in a struggle between two identities, 
does not clarify why things are happening. We produce a mimesis of the world in the language of the 
sociologist, a reassembling of objects that we ourselves are responsible for making. Finally, network 
makes it difficult to see hierarchy: the ‘flat topography’ of ANT is far removed from the tough 
realities of exclusion, discrimination and subordination experienced by many people. We are faced 
with a radical disjuncture between the experiences and perceptions of most people and the description 
of the world offered by professional sociologists.  
There are many critical points we could raise here, but two are, I think, of importance. The 
first is that we are replacing uncertainty with precision, a precision that is fictive. This happens when 
we replace, or re-inscribe, an unknown entity – society – with something that we have constructed a 
partial definition of – network. By saying society = network it looks as if we have provided greater 
precision and understanding of the social world. But we have actually done the opposite: we didn’t 
know what society was in the first place, and we have avoided discussion of this by replacing the 
whole with a part (for networks, if they exist, must at least be a part of society, and if not, if they are 
all of society, then we are just swapping one unknown thing for another). This metonymy is certainly 
prevalent in the social sciences, but may not be helpful. Apart from anything else, using the metonym 
‘network’ to represent the whole means that we will not see other things, things that are perhaps more 
useful for sociological analysis. An obvious one is ‘community’ – a term that is rarely deployed by 
either Whitean sociologists or ANTers.  
The second is a criticism that many post-structuralists laid at the door of the modernists: the 
replacement of actors’ intentions with other things. In White’s network sociology whatever we think 
we may be doing – talking about the weather, discussing laboratory data, rubbishing the England 
football team’s latest outing – are actually attempts at control of identity. In ANT similar 
replacements take place: the laboratory worker thinks they are analysing data, but actually they are 
constructing a network of relations with human and non-human actors.  
And this takes us to another point: what does it mean to be identified as being a part of a 
network when one is not aware of it? Is the network ‘real’? What would that mean, in terms of how 
we might experience it? And have we as sociologists learned anything by assigning or identifying 
people as being members of networks if they themselves don’t think that they are? In White’s recent 
work he looks at the restructuring of a fashion brand, Armani, using network sociology. The Armani 
fashion house shifted from being one brand in 1975 to being a ‘companionate / segregate family of 
brands in 2006’ (White et al., 2007: 196). Perhaps, but in what ways can we say that the customers of 
the Armani fashion house are ‘dynamic stochastic networks of customers’ (Ibid)? How can customers 
of a brand form a network with each other when they have no knowledge of who the other customers 
are? At least in most ANT studies the actors being discussed would probably have some knowledge of 
the other actants being posited as part of the network; in White’s sociology one need have no 
cognisance of one’s position in a network, or even that a network exists. It is only the sociologist, 
with their specialised tools, that can identify the network and also understand what the network is for.  
Of course, many people do think they are part of a network: we talk of our network of friends 
or colleagues, and we, particularly academics, talk about networking as an activity that is part of our 
job. This everyday usage of the network metaphor blurs the line between the abstract and the actual: 
we conceptualise ourselves as part of a network, and then we find that we are in a network of 
companions / colleagues doing ‘networking’ when we meet up. We can even appraise our skills at 
networking – we know how good or bad we are at networking, or at least doing  some of the actions 
that are associated with networking, by counting and comparing the number of ‘friends’ we have 
accumulated on our social networking sites of choice (e.g. Facebook, Twitter or MySpace).  
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These networks, however, are different from ANT or White’s networks, and for two reasons. 
The first is a mundane, perhaps even trivial, reason: they are not the sort of networks that are studied 
by either White or ANT. The second is more significant: ANT and White’s networks exist 
objectively, independent of actors in much the same way that society exists, according to many 
sociologists (e.g. Durkheim or Simmel). Our Facebook network exists only in our actions and 
thoughts and does not have objective features discernable to others.  
 
Conclusion 
 
When we try and understand the world – and this is the shared project we are all involved in – we 
social scientists are perpetually faced with the problem of abstraction: how do we adequately 
represent the world we see around us when we are constantly abstracting it into concepts and 
theories? The to-do list for a conceptual scheme that helps us to understand everything ‘social’ (and 
that is, after all, the task that both White and ANT set themselves, albeit in very different ways) is 
quite challenging, and clearly we are always going to be producing partial or inadequate accounts in 
some way or other. But perhaps reflecting on this can help to move us forward. One thing we can do 
is move from metaphorical constructs to experiences in the world – and in terms of human social 
relations using the categories and meanings that people deploy in their everyday experiences would be 
useful. Alternatively we could, perhaps, follow Baldamus who noted that there is only one theoretical 
method in sociology, Max Weber’s ‘celebrated method of constructing ideal types’ (Baldamus, 1976: 
9). Yet Weber’s method, powerful though it is, does not help us address the other fundamental 
problem we face: the metaphorical aspect of our language. As Lakoff and Johnson note, we cannot 
escape the metaphors we live by (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). But that doesn’t mean we should ignore 
this: quite the opposite is in order. What we need to do is to notice the metaphors that we are using, 
and to clearly describe them as such. Our endeavours in explaining and understanding the social 
world can only be based on our experiences, and the experiences of others; we need to recognise this, 
and focus on this, and also recognise that some metaphors will work at the expense of metaphors 
whilst others will enhance our experiences, a point Turner makes in comparing sociology and 
literature (Turner, 2010). Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor (Goffman, 1959) enhances our 
experience of social interaction, but also hides some aspects of social experiences, and Goffman 
himself was clear that the metaphor is scaffolding that can be taken down when the job is done 
(Turner, 2010: 111). Similarly with the network metaphor: it can enhance our understanding of some 
aspects of social experience, but may occlude other things that are equally important.  
The network metaphor is as prevalent as ever, and as powerful as ever. In ANT and in 
White’s social network sociology we are presented with reductive pictures of the world where 
phenomena are reduced to their inclusion in networks, and, in White’s work, where people are all and 
always engaged in a perpetual struggle for footing, security and control of identity. The power of such 
approaches is obvious: clear, crystalline and simple explanations of motivations and interconnections. 
But what they omit is far more significant: meaning. This omission of meaning is at two levels. The 
first is the removal of the actors’ meanings that are attached to their actions and their replacement 
with the metaphor.  The second is the lack of reflection by the social scientist on what meanings they 
are attaching to the metaphor. For example, the network metaphor implies a particular spatial 
configuration, and this can in some cases be helpful. But as Baldamus points out, the two-dimensional 
imagery of the network metaphor is unhelpful, particularly in sociology of science 
 
[T]he threads connecting the knots are spread out across a flat surface. As a result the net cannot 
capture the temporal dimension of the genesis of new concepts and new levels of abstraction. 
Thus, the problem of the growth and the vanishing of ‘knowledge’ remains largely inaccessible 
and undecidable in this approach. (Baldamus, [1982] 2010: 120) 
 
We need to use an alternative approach, where we gradually work up more and more sophisticated 
concepts that participants can already identify their membership of, or exclusion from, attachment to 
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or repulsion from. Whilst doing this we will need to recognise our own deployment of metaphor and 
should critically reflect on the meanings we are attaching to these. One, final, step is also necessary: a 
critical reflection on the necessity of the metaphors we are using. Latour’s incredibly detailed studies 
of what people actually do, be that making law, designing a transport system, working in a 
biochemistry laboratory, tell us a huge amount about the social world and how it works. So much so 
that the metaphor of network seems rather unnecessary in these studies and Latour’s exhortation to 
‘just describe the state of affairs at hand’ would seem to support this observation (Latour, 2004: 66). 
In contrast to Latour’s decorative networks, White’s networks are generative, forming the world 
around us and in his theory you cannot ignore them. Yet their necessity is never questioned or even 
discussed in White’s work. 
Reducing everything to network hides things from us, and makes us think we have been 
precise when we have been vague. Even just deploying the network metaphor binds us to a way of 
picturing the world that may inappropriate in many cases: our language is creating objects that we 
then go and find. The deployment of this metaphor means we will inevitably make certain 
assumptions about the world and its structure.  We are also becoming used to describing our everyday 
world in terms of ‘networks’ and ‘networking’, a consequence of how Facebook, Twitter and other 
online resources are presented to us.  But despite its prevalence, persistence and power the network 
metaphor is just an abstraction, and we need to remember this 
 
‘No wonder kids grow up crazy. A cat’s cradle is nothing but a bunch of X’s between 
somebody’s hands, and little kids look and look and look at all those X’s.’  
‘And?’ 
‘No damn cat, and no damn cradle.’ (Vonnegut, [1963] 1965: 105) 
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